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ABSTRACT 
Attention can be guided by expectations stemming from long-term memories. In addition 
to such endogenous cues, exogenous salient stimuli capture attention, such as those 
conveying threat. This study examined the extent to which threatening distractors affect 
the employment of memories in guiding attention, and whether this is affected by trait 
anxiety. Emotional distractors were incorporated into a speeded target detection task, in 
which memory cues were presented simultaneously with task irrelevant emotional faces. 
Fearful face distractors disrupted target detection significantly more than neutral faces 
and the additional disruption to task performance from fearful compared with neutral 
faces was positively correlated with trait anxiety scores. The current findings of 
attentional capture by threat in the context of a second, powerful endogenous driver of 
attention underscore the magnitude of anxiety-related attention to threat. That is, 
threatening stimuli are sufficiently salient to induce prolonged disruption to goal directed 
behavior in anxious individuals.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Selective attention to threatening information facilitates the rapid detection of potentially 
threatening stimuli and the execution of appropriate responses (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 
Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Whilst prioritizing attention to potentially threatening 
environmental stimuli has clear evolutionary value, cognitive and clinical psychology 
models propose that excessive attentional biases toward threat may contribute to the 
etiology and maintenance of clinical states of anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Excessive 
vigilance to threat can distort perception, and can play both a causal and reinforcing role 
in anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 1994, 2002). 
It is possible to experimentally model selective attention to threat, which allows for the 
careful characterization of anxiety-related abnormalities in threat processing (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010). A commonly used paradigm is the attentional-probe task 
(MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), in which a probe replaces 
one of a pair of briefly presented threatening and neutral stimuli. An attentional bias 
toward threat is indexed by reduced reaction times to probes replacing threatening versus 
non-threatening stimuli. Such paradigms have demonstrated that anxious individuals 
detect threatening stimuli more readily and show subsequent impairment in disengaging 
from threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  
Studies in which threat biases are directly modified through training procedures have 
established the critical role played by preferential attention to threat in the cause and 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (MacLeod, Rutherford, Campbell, Ebsworthy, & 
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Holker, 2002). Such work has also been instrumental in identifying specific cognitive 
targets of therapeutic interventions and in developing novel treatment approaches, such as 
attentional bias modification (Bar-Haim, 2010; Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014; 
Hakamata et al., 2010; MacLeod & Holmes, 2012; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012).  
Whilst cognitive paradigms such as the attentional-probe task have played an important 
role in our understanding of the threat biases associated with anxiety, they have been 
criticized for a lack of sensitivity (Sigurjónsdóttir, Sigurardóttir, Björnsson, & 
Kristjánsson, 2015) and reliability (Grafton et al. (in press), Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 
2009). Furthermore, the reliance on a limited set of methods to assess biased attention to 
threat may have hampered our understanding of the cognitive processes that are disrupted 
in anxiety. There remains a need for the development of additional and diverse methods 
to assess dysfunctional attention to threat in order to fine-tune theories, reveal 
mechanisms, and develop more effective cognitive treatments.   
Existing paradigms typically examine the influence of threat on attention in isolation. For 
example, the attentional-probe task presents competing stimuli of varying valence to 
assess their relative pull on attention. However, outside controlled laboratory settings, 
attention is not exclusively guided by threat but is driven by a myriad of competing 
biases. Our cognition is governed by current goals, and attention is consequently guided 
to optimize the fulfillment of these goals. Expectations about relevant upcoming events 
facilitate the perceptual analysis and selection of relevant stimuli by activating goal-
related schemata in working memory and setting in motion anticipatory and preparatory 
functions (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Theeuwes, Belopolsky, 
& Olivers, 2009). Furthermore, long-term memories provide an additional source of 
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predictions that significantly enhance behavioral performance and neural processing of 
target stimuli occurring within learned, anticipated contexts (Chun & Jiang, 1999; 
Summerfield et al., 2006).  
Exogenous threat distraction is likely to operate in the context of non-emotional 
endogenous cognitive biases that are deployed to support goal attainment. As threat has 
an exaggerated pull on attention in anxious individuals, it is plausible that the perceptual 
salience of threatening stimuli interferes with expectation-driven attention selection and 
that the magnitude of such interference correlates positively with trait anxiety. There are 
existing paradigms that examine threat biases in the context of emotion-related 
interference of the employment of expectations. For example, the Posner-style emotional 
spatial cueing paradigm presents neutral and threatening spatial cues that either validly or 
invalidly predict an upcoming target location (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; 
Posner, 1980).  Previous studies using this paradigm have demonstrated threat biases in 
anxious individuals, indicated by quicker responding to valid threat trials coupled with 
slowed responding to invalid threat trials, compared to benign-cued trials (Bar-Haim, 
Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Cisler, Bacon, & 
Williams, 2009; Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 2008). Such tasks exploit external 
cues, which are internalized and used to predict task-relevant events. However, most 
endogenous drivers of visual attention are intrinsic to a context, based on expectations 
built upon prior experience, stored within memories. For example, it has been established 
that long-term memories for target locations within previously encountered scenes can 
enhance perceptual sensitivity and response speeds to identify and discriminate targets in 
those scenes (Patai, Doallo, & Nobre, 2012; Summerfield, Gitelman, Mesulam, & Nobre, 
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2006). Considering the effect of threat on the processing of task-relevant endogenous 
signals in the Posner-style task, an appropriate follow-up enquiry is whether threatening 
stimuli may similarly affect the employment of learned intrinsic non-emotional cognitive 
biases; and whether this is exacerbated in, or exclusive to, anxious individuals.  
The current study therefore investigated the effect of emotionally salient distractors on 
memory-guided attentional orienting, as well as the dependence of these effects on 
individual differences in trait anxiety. Our study complements investigations that have 
considered how emotional content intrinsic to material to be learned affects subsequent 
memory (e.g., Buratto, Pottage, Brown, Morrison, & Schaefer, 2014; Srinivasan & 
Gupta, 2010). Our interest was in understanding whether distraction by emotional 
material interacted with everyday non-emotional, memory-based attentional biases, 
which we propose to be pervasive and highly adaptive in guiding performance (Marvin 
M. Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007)(Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007). In order to investigate 
this, emotional distractors were incorporated into an existing memory-guided orienting 
task (Patai et al., 2012).  In this task, participants explore visual scenes overtly to learn 
the unique locations of hidden predefined targets. Twenty-four hours later, participants 
perform a speeded target-detection task in which the previously learned scenes act as 
cues to orient attention based on participants’ long-term memories of the target location 
in each scene. Using this paradigm, previous studies have reported significant benefits in 
the perceptual sensitivity and speed to identify and discriminate targets on valid, 
compared to invalid trials (Salvato, Patai, & Nobre, 2016; Summerfield et al., 2006; 
Summerfield, Rao, Garside, & Nobre, 2011), demonstrating that participants’ memories 
were effectively used to guide attention to learned target locations. 
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The current study adapted this paradigm to include emotional distractors, which were 
presented simultaneously with the memory cues. A single fearful or neutral face was 
embedded in the cue scenes, and the extent to which the fearful distractors influenced 
subsequent target detection, as compared to neutral distractors, indexed emotion-related 
distraction. Thus, we were able to investigate the extent to which threat distractors 
captured attention in complex scenes so as to disrupt memory-based attention. We 
predicted that fearful faces would capture attention to a greater extent and consequently 
be more disruptive to task performance than neutral faces. Moreover, given that 
contemporary cognitive models of anxiety suggest that it is characterized by an over-
dominance of exogenous, bottom-up drivers of attention, and impaired regulation of this 
by endogenous, top-down, goal-directed attentional control mechanisms (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), we predicted that the degree of distractor disruption 
was expected to be positively associated with trait anxiety.  
 
METHODS 
Participants 
Thirty-two participants (22 females, 10 males), aged 19-26 years (mean: 20.9 years), 
were recruited through an online participant database and through online adverts and 
local flyers. The current sample size is comparable to other studies investigating anxiety-
related threat biases, particularly those similarly using median-split analyses (Fox, 2008; 
Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006). All participants had 
normal or corrected vision, had no history of neurological or psychiatric illness, and were 
fluent in English. Participants gave their written informed consent and were compensated 
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£10/hour for their participation. The study was approved by the Oxford University 
Central University Research Ethics Committee (MSD-IDREC-C1-2014-075).  
  
Procedure 
Participants attended two test sessions at the Department of Psychiatry at the University 
of Oxford, conducted 24 hours apart. In the first session, participants completed the trait 
anxiety scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger, 
1983), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1996) and the 
Neuroticism subscale of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-N; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975). They then completed the Learning Task (see below). The following day, 
participants returned to complete the Orienting and Memory Tasks, which were always 
completed in this order.  
Stimuli 
Scenes and Keys 
168 everyday scenes (see Figure 1a for examples) were taken from an existing database 
obtained collectively by the laboratory. The set consisted of 35 indoor scenes and 133 
outdoor scenes with varied content. The presence of people was kept at a minimum, as 
was the use of large, salient objects in the foreground. Given their intended naturalistic 
quality, there was inevitable variability across scenes. However, by counterbalancing the 
scenes across experimental conditions, we were able to ensure that intrinsic 
characteristics of the scenes did not affect results. Scene stimuli will be made available 
on request. Scenes were sized 1000 x 750 pixels and subtended 22° x 17° of visual angle 
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when viewed from 100 cm. In the Learning Task (see Figure 1a), a gold key (15 x 29 
pixels, equivalent to 0.3° x 0.7°) was embedded in one of the four quadrants of the scene. 
In the Orienting Task, the key was larger and brighter (25 × 49 pixels, equivalent to 0.6° 
× 1.1°) to enhance contrast and thus prevent chance-level accuracy rates.  
 
Faces  
A total of 168 colored face stimuli were used in the Orienting Task.  The face stimuli 
were taken from the Amsterdam Dynamic Facial Expressions Set (17 faces) (van der 
Schalk, Hawk, Fischer, & Doosje, 2011), Pictures of Facial Affect (13 faces) (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1976), the Radboud Faces Database (15 faces) (Langner et al., 2010) and the 
NimStim Set of Facial Expressions (39 faces) (Tottenham et al., 2009). 84 different face 
identities were used (50 male), each with a fearful and a neutral expression (see Figure 2a 
for examples).  A standardized oval was used to crop the faces to ensure that the faces 
were of a standard size across trials. The oval was placed so as to include only the eyes, 
nose and mouth, part of the chin, and the top of the hairline. Faces were 91 x 140 pixels 
(equivalent to 2.1°x 3.2° when viewed from 100 cm). An additional face, taken from the 
Facial Expressions and Emotion Database of the Technical University Munich (Walhoff, 
2006), was used for the practice trials of the Orienting Task.  This face was pixelated 
using Adobe Photoshop (version CS6), creating a 91 x 140-pixel oval.  
 
Tasks 
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The entire memory-guided orienting experiment consisted of three experimental phases: a 
Learning Task; an Orienting Task; and a Memory Task.   
 
Learning Task  
The Learning Task was based on that reported by Patai and colleagues (2012). 
Participants were instructed to search for a small gold-colored key (target) in each of 168 
scenes. Scenes were viewed one at a time, and participants searched for the key 
embedded in one of the 4 quadrants (Figure 1a). They were free to move their eyes (overt 
search). Once they had located the key, participants responded by clicking the mouse to 
activate the cursor and then positioning it on the key location. Following the response, 
visual written feedback (1000 ms) was provided (i.e. ‘key found’ or ‘key not found’) on 
each trial. Scenes remained on the screen for 2 minutes or until a response was made. If 
participants did not respond within 2 minutes, they received feedback reading ‘key not 
found’, followed by the start of the next trial. 
After searching for the key in all 168 scenes, participants took a brief break and then 
repeated the procedure for the same set of scenes. In total, participants completed the 
procedure five times. The key remained in the same location within each scene for each 
of these five learning blocks, thereby allowing participants to form spatial-contextual 
memories of the location of the key in each scene. The presentation order of scenes was 
randomized in each block. Written feedback was presented at the conclusion of each 
block, indicating the total fraction of keys found. Search times and accuracy were 
recorded. A circle with a radius of 50 pixels around the target (key) defined the region 
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within which responses were deemed accurate. Scenes for which participants did not 
locate the key in two or more blocks were excluded from further analyses.  
 
Orienting Task  
The Orienting Task was performed 24 hours after the Learning Task (Figure 2). 
Participants were instructed to maintain central fixation during each trial by continually 
fixating on a central cross, which remained on the screen throughout the entire task. 
Participants were asked to try to refrain from blinking during scene presentations.  
Participants first completed a practice session containing 12 novel scenes with a 
distracting scrambled face. Using a scrambled face during the practice session allowed 
participants to become accustomed to the appearance of distractor stimuli without 
habituating to face valence. Participants were first shown a novel cue scene for 100 ms, 
featuring the scrambled face. After an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) ranging between 750 
and 1150 ms, the same scene reappeared for 200 ms; the key was present in half of these 
target scenes in a randomly varied location. Participants had to indicate whether the key 
was present or absent by making a forced-choice response using the mouse. After 
completing the practice session, participants were given the opportunity to clarify any 
outstanding questions and then started the task.  
In the experimental task, each trial began with the brief presentation of a cue scene, 
which was a scene that participants had previously been exposed to during the Learning 
Task. This cue scene was presented for 100 ms and had a fearful or neutral face 
embedded in it. The key was never present in the cue scene. After a random ISI ranging 
from 750 to 1150 ms, the same scene was presented again without the face for 200 ms. 
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On half of the trials (i.e. on 84 trials), this scene contained the target key, which was 
located in either a valid (learned) or in an invalid (novel) location in the opposite 
hemifield. Trials in which the key was present were equally divided into valid and invalid 
trials (42 trials each). On the remaining 84 trials, the key was not present in the scene. 
Participants were asked to indicate whether the key was present or absent via a left or 
right mouse click, respectively, and were given a 1000 ms time window to respond. After 
a random inter-trial interval of 750 to 1150 ms, the next trial began. Self-timed breaks 
were provided after every 14 trials. During the cue scene, faces were always located in a 
different quadrant from both the learned (valid) and novel (invalid) key location. That is, 
faces never cued valid or invalid key locations and were therefore always distractors 
(Figure 2a). Participants were told that the faces were not relevant to the task and were 
instructed to ignore them. 
All 168 scenes from the Learning Task were included in the Orienting Task and the 
assignment of each scene according to the experimental conditions of target presence 
(present, absent), validity (valid, invalid), and face emotion (fearful, neutral) was 
counterbalanced across participants, resulting in eight versions of the task.  Accuracy of 
target detection and reaction time (RT) were used as outcome measures on this task.  
Individual raw RTs above or below three standard deviations across conditions were 
excluded from the analyses for each participant. This resulted in the removal of 2.6% of 
trials. Trials removed from RT analyses on this basis were also excluded from the 
accuracy analyses.  
 
Memory Task  
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Following the Orienting Task, participants completed a memory recall test. In this task, 
participants viewed each of the 168 scenes in turn, and indicated the learned location of 
the key (Figure 3a). After indicating the remembered location by positioning the cursor 
on the location and using a mouse click to place their response, participants were asked to 
complete a confidence rating of their memory (‘not at all’, ‘fairly’, ‘very’, confident), 
using the left, center, and right mouse buttons respectively. Feedback was not provided 
for memory recall. Mean distance between the original and indicated key locations was 
used as an index of spatial recall; this was calculated as the Euclidean distance between 
the X and Y coordinates of response and actual key location. 
 
a 
 
 
 
 
b 
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Fig. 1: Learning Task: design and results. (a) Participants overtly searched for keys, located in 1 of 4 
quadrants, for 168 naturalistic scenes (three examples shown, red box for illustrative purposes only) (b) 
Over the course of learning blocks, participants became more accurate and quicker at detecting targets.  
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Fig. 2: Orienting Task: design and results. (a) Cue scenes containing either fearful or neutral faces were 
presented for 100 ms. After an ISI ranging from 750-1150 ms, target scenes, which presented the key on 
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half the trials, appeared for 200 ms.. (b) All participants showed a significant validity effect, whereby they 
exhibited greater accuracy for valid versus invalid trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
Asterisks indicate significant differences between valid and invalid conditions (p ≤ .05). (c) While valid 
trials yielded overall greater accuracy, results showed no validity x emotion interaction. (d) There was a 
significant positive correlation between STAI-T scores (X axis) and mean accuracy difference scores (top). 
Separate correlations for each emotion condition confirmed that STAI-T was significantly negatively 
correlated with accuracy on trials containing fearful distractors (bottom left), while STAI-T did not 
correlate with accuracy on trials with neutral distractors (bottom right).  
 
 
a 
 
b 
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Fig. 3: Memory Task: design and results (a) Participants indicated the learned location of the key, followed 
by a confidence rating.  (b) Mean distance (Y axis) from target location as a function of confidence ratings 
(X axis). Mean distance decreased as confidence ratings increased. Error bars represent standard errors of 
the mean. 
 
Analyses 
The data were analyzed using ANCOVA, with task conditions included as within 
subjects factors and trait anxiety (STAI-T) scores included as a continuous predictor.  
Across analyses, where the assumption of sphericity was violated, degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity. All post-hoc tests were 
conducted with Bonferroni correction.  
 
 
RESULTS 
Participants’ trait anxiety scores ranged from 28 to 50 (mean: 39.2, SD: 6.2, see Figure 
4). These scores are similar to the published norms for this age group (mean: 36, SD: 10) 
(Spielberger, 1983).  
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Fig. 4: The spread of STAI-trait scores. The Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) revealed no 
evidence (p > 0.05) that the distribution of STAI-T  scores was non-normal.  
 
Learning Task  
Search times decreased and accuracy increased with learning over the five overt-search 
blocks (see Figure 1b). Because of the long time allowed for searching for the target 
within each scene, the accuracy for locating the target key was consistently high from the 
first learning block (accuracy, SD, range: 99, 0.70, 1.80 %). Nevertheless, ANOVAs 
testing for linear increases in accuracy showed a main effect of learning block [F (2.89, 
83.88) = 5.62, p = 0.002, ηp2 = 0.16] and significant linear contrast over the learning 
blocks [F (1, 30) = 17.76, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.372]. Reaction times showed strong 
modulation over learning. There was a significant main effect of learning block [F (1.53, 
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46.03) = 159.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.837] and a significant linear decrease in search times 
over blocks [F (1, 31) = 217.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.875].  
To assess potential anxiety effects, a mixed-model ANCOVA was conducted with a 
within-subject factor of block (1-5) and trait anxiety (STAI-T) as a continuous predictor. 
There was no main effect of trait anxiety or interaction between trait anxiety and block 
for accuracy [main effect: F (1,30) = 0.49, p = 0.49, ηp2 = .016; interaction: F (4, 120) = 
0.56, p = 0.69, ηp2 = .018] or search times [main effect: [F (1,30) = 1.30, p = 0.26, ηp2 = 
.041; interaction: F (4, 120) = 1.12, p = .35, ηp2 = .036]. Anxiety therefore did not impact 
the formation of new spatial-contextual associations for non-emotional targets within 
scenes. The comparable learning across trait anxiety provides a clean baseline for the 
subsequent Orienting Task, allowing for anxiety-related emotional capture effects to 
clearly be isolated.   
One participant did not successfully locate the key in one of the scenes in 2 of the blocks 
and this participant’s data for this scene was excluded from further analyses. 
 
Orienting Task 
A mixed-model ANCOVA was conducted on percent correct accuracy scores using 
within-subject factors of face emotion (fearful, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid), and 
trait anxiety as a continuous predictor. This showed a significant main effect of validity 
[F (1, 30) = 4.03, p = .05, ηp2 = .19], reflecting increased accuracy on valid compared to 
invalid trials [valid: 77.6%, CI = (75.4, 79.8) invalid: 71.6%, CI = (69.2, 73.9)] (see 
Figure 2b). There was also a significant main effect of emotion [F (1, 30) = 6.10, p = .02, 
ηp2 =.17], reflecting increased accuracy on trials preceded by a neutral face compared 
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with a fearful face [mean percent correct: neutral 75.5%, CI = (73.3, 77.7), fearful 73.7%, 
CI = (71.7, 75.7)], and a significant interaction between face emotion and trait anxiety, [F 
(1, 30) = 8.13, p = .008, ηp2 =0.21]. To clarify this face emotion x trait anxiety interaction 
further, the difference in mean accuracy for fearful vs. neutral conditions, normalized 
against the overall mean accuracy across conditions, was used to test for correlations 
between emotional distraction and STAI –T scores. This yielded a significant positive 
correlation, r = .48, p = .006. Separate correlations between STAI-T and accuracy on 
trials containing fearful distractors and accuracy on trials with neutral distractors revealed 
that anxiety was significantly negatively correlated with accuracy on fearful distractor 
trials, r = -.39, p = .027, while the correlation between anxiety and accuracy on neutral 
distractors trials was not significant, r = -.006, p = .98 (see Figure 2d). There was no 
interaction between validity and emotion, p = .91 (see Figure 2c).  
As both neuroticism and depression are often comorbid with anxiety, separate analyses 
were conducted using neuroticism (EPQN) and depression (BDI) scores to assess 
whether the observed threat distraction was additionally driven by neuroticism and 
depression. Two ANCOVAs were conducted on accuracy, with the respective continuous 
predictors of neuroticism and depression, and validity and face emotion as within-
subjects factors. The analysis using neuroticism scores revealed a significant validity 
effect, F (1, 30) = 11.30, p = .002, ηp2 = .27, and a trending interaction between emotion 
and neuroticism, F (1, 30) = 3.53, p = .070, ηp2 = .11. The ANCOVA using depression 
scores showed a significant main effect of validity, F (1, 30) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .39. 
There were no further main effects or interactions, all p’s > .20. 
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Reaction times were not of primary interest in this task, which required a forced-choice 
response based on a difficult perceptual discrimination. Nevertheless, RTs were analyzed 
for completeness. Reaction times were compared for correct trials. Analysis of RTs 
revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all p’s > .33).   
     
Memory Task 
The mean distance between the original and indicated key location was 207.56 pixels (SD 
= 79.47). Participants’ confidence ratings varied in accordance with the mean distance 
between their response and the key location; as they became less confident their accuracy 
decreased (Figure 3b). 
To determine whether distractor emotion and target validity from the preceding Orienting 
Task affected subsequent recall, a mixed-model ANCOVA was conducted with within-
subject factors of face emotion (fearful, neutral) and validity (valid, invalid), and trait 
anxiety (STAI- T) as a continuous predictor. There was no significant effect of validity, 
emotion or trait anxiety, and no significant interactions (all p’s > .4). The lack of 
interaction between emotion and anxiety suggests that recall for fearful versus neutral 
faces did not differ as a function of anxiety. Further analyses also confirmed that there 
were no significant differences in recall on trials in which the key was absent versus 
present in the Orienting Task.  
To complement these findings and to provide a broader index of accuracy, accuracy was 
indexed by quadrant identification. A mixed-model ANCOVA was conducted with target 
validity and distractor emotion of the preceding Orienting task as within-subjects factors 
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and trait anxiety as a continuous predictor. There was no significant effect of validity, 
emotion or trait anxiety, and no significant interactions (all p’s > .31).  
To assess the degree to which target validity and distractor emotion from the Orienting 
task affected reaction times in the memory task, a further mixed-model ANCOVA was 
conducted, comparable to that above. Results showed no significant main effects of 
validity, emotion or trait anxiety, and no significant interactions (all p’s > .34). 
Finally, to determine whether the location of the previous distractor faces influenced 
participants’ explicit memories of the target locations, we compared the incidence of 
participants incorrectly indicating that the memorized target location was in the quadrant 
previously occupied by the distractor face versus in either of the other two incorrect 
quadrants. A comparison of these quantities revealed no significant differences in the 
quantity of errors occurring in the quadrant of the face and the average quantity of errors 
occurring in the remaining two quadrants, t (31) = 0.875, p = .34, d = 0.17, CI = (-0.97, 
2.72). These results suggest that the location of the distractor faces did not affect 
participants’ explicit memories. 
 
 
DISCUSSION:  
The current study investigated the effect of emotionally salient distractors on memory-
guided attentional orienting, and how this is modulated by trait anxiety. Emotional 
distractors were incorporated into a speeded target detection task, in which non-emotional 
memory cues were presented simultaneously with irrelevant distracting fearful or neutral 
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face stimuli. Consistent with our predictions, we found that fearful face distractors 
disrupted performance on a subsequent target detection task significantly more than 
neutral face distractors. Importantly, the extent to which fearful faces were more 
disruptive to task performance than neutral faces was positively correlated with trait 
anxiety scores, and further analyses highlight that this threat-related disruption to task 
performance was only evident in those participants with high trait anxiety scores.   
Attention is guided by a myriad of competing influences. In this study, we adapted an 
experimental paradigm for investigating long-term memory-guided orienting of attention 
to incorporate emotional distractors.  In this way, we were able to measure the effect of 
threat distraction within the context of another, endogenous, and non-emotional driver of 
attention and assess the relative pull of each of these on attention, indexed by task 
performance.  Consistent with previous studies (Patai et al., 2012), we found that there 
was a significant effect of target validity; targets that appeared in the expected (learned) 
location were more accurately detected than those that appeared in a location that was 
incongruous with the previous learning trials.  
Such an effect is a demonstration of the expected memory-guided attentional cueing, and 
confirms that participants were using memory cues based on their previous learning to 
spatially orient their attention to the expected location of the key. In addition, there was a 
significant effect of the emotion of the face, whereby participants were more accurate in 
their detection of targets in scenes that had been preceded by a neutral face distractor, 
than those preceded by a fearful face distractor. Thus, as predicted, the fearful face 
disrupted task performance to a greater extent than neutral face distractors. Interestingly 
the emotional-distraction effect did not significantly interact with memory-based 
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orienting of attention, suggesting that multiple sources of biases can operate concurrently 
and independently to influence task performance.   
Importantly, the current study demonstrated that the extent to which fearful, compared to 
neutral, faces disrupted task performance correlated with trait anxiety scores.  Thus, the 
performance of participants who scored highly on a self-report measure of trait anxiety 
was disproportionately disrupted by fearful versus neutral face distractors, compared with 
low trait anxiety participants. This is consistent with previous literature demonstrating 
that anxious individuals more readily detect threat and show subsequent impairment in 
disengaging from such threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010; MacLeod & Mathews, 2012). 
Meta-analyses of previous studies have similarly reported such attentional biases toward 
threatening stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), using paradigms such as the attentional probe 
task (MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Results are also in line with The 
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), which posits that anxiety is marked by 
an impaired balance between bottom-up exogenous attention and top-down endogenous 
attention, with the former receiving exaggerated priority. That is, anxious individuals 
exhibit greater influence of the stimulus-driven system coupled with deficient top-down 
control, resulting in impaired goal fulfillment and task performance. The current findings 
demonstrate such distorted weighting, with trait anxiety correlated with greater 
distraction by the fearful faces at the expense of task-relevant target detection, suggesting 
a bias toward the bottom-up salience of threat paired with weak input of top-down 
control. 
The current paradigm expands on previous findings by placing threat biases in the 
context of competing non-emotional drivers of attention, thereby creating a more realistic 
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context within which to investigate anxiety-related biases. In addition to the ecological 
validity accorded by modeling multiple and competing drivers of attention, the use of 
complex naturalistic scenes further enhances the paradigm’s realistic quality. Studying 
attentional orienting in contexts closely resembling our everyday environments provides 
a more accurate depiction of how we filter information-rich environments to direct 
attention toward relevant information.  
It is interesting to note that there was a relatively long delay between the presentation of 
the cue scene, containing the face distractor, and the target presentation (750-1150 ms).  
Any distraction effect of fearful compared with neutral faces would therefore have had to 
persist across this delay period in order to influence target detection. As the fearful face 
was presented for only 100ms, the observed disruption to subsequent task performance 
was not contingent on the continued presence of a threatening stimulus. This suggests 
that anxious participants continued to mentally engage with the fearful faces over an 
extended period of time. Studies examining attentional biases to threat often restrict their 
scope of investigation to reactivity to threat at early stages of processing (Schuyler et al., 
2014). However, it is increasingly recognized that more prolonged disruption to task 
performance from threat distractors may be associated with anxiety, and such disruption 
may have a particularly impairing effect on the daily life of anxious individuals (Forster, 
Nunez-Elizalde, Castle, & Bishop, 2014 Schuyler et al 2014). Whilst early reactivity to 
threatening stimuli may serve a biologically adaptive purpose across all individuals, it 
may be equally adaptive to subsequently employ emotion regulatory processes in order to 
readily recover from the adverse effects of such initial threat detection (Forster et al., 
2014). As such, this represents a target for improving cognitive treatments of anxiety.  
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Given that even simple threatening stimuli of the type used here are sufficiently salient to 
disrupt the usage of memories in orienting attention in anxious individuals, strategies to 
mitigate the downstream effects in the lives of patients are much needed. Such processes 
may well underlie the functional impairments associated with anxiety such as lapses in 
concentration and impoverished performance on daily tasks. However, given the testing 
of healthy volunteers based only on individual differences in trait anxiety, the 
implications for a clinical population are limited and must be viewed with caution. 
The findings must be interpreted in light of several limitations. First, the distracting 
stimuli in the current study were solely neutral and threatening faces, with the latter’s 
depicted emotion necessarily rendering them more perceptually salient. Alhough fear is a 
particularly relevant emotional category to consider in the context of anxiety, using only 
one category necessarily provides only limited insights into how emotional saliency 
biases performance in the context of anxiety. Future research should therefore include 
stimuli depicting other emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise) as distractor stimuli in the 
paradigm in order to clarify whether the anxiety-related distraction effects are specific to 
threat valence. 
Second, the STAI-state scale was not assessed. Previous research has demonstrated a 
dissociation between the attentional processes targeted by trait anxiety and those affected 
by state anxiety. While the former modulates executive control processes, the latter 
affects the alerting and orienting networks of attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, 
Rueda, & Kanske, 2007). The relationship between state and trait anxiety has been 
delineated, such that trait anxiety is marked by a predisposition to experience heightened 
state anxiety when confronted with threat (Endler & Kocovski, 2001). The current study 
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found that trait anxiety modulated the degree of threat distraction. However, we cannot 
ascertain the extent to which state anxiety contributed to such threat distraction. Given 
the outlined differences in the two forms of anxiety, future research investigating the 
interaction of threat biases and memory-guided orienting should consider both state and 
trait anxiety as variables. 
Finally, face stimuli from multiple databases were used as to ensure that each scene 
contained a unique distractor face in the Orienting task in order to minimize habituation 
effects (Breiter et al., 1996; Gauthier et al., 2000). However, as this inevitably introduced 
variation to the stimuli set, a mixed-design ANCOVA was conducted with face sets (1-4) 
as the between-subjects factor and trait anxiety as the continuous predictor for accuracy 
(% correct) in the Orienting task to assess whether faces from different databases led to 
different results in overall accuracy. Results showed no main effect of face sets, p = 
0.766, suggesting that accuracy in the Orienting task did not differ between the face sets. 
Further, there was no interaction with STAI-T, p = 0.827. 
In summary, this study expands the investigation of anxiety-related threat biases to 
incorporate other endogenous drivers of attention, thus modeling vigilance to threat 
within the context of complex, competing sources of influence on attention. These 
findings situate the well-documented anxiety-related attentional biases within a relatively 
more ecologically valid context and lend weight to the notion that delayed recovery from 
threat distractors, and the resulting prolonged disruption of goal directed behavior, is 
aberrant in anxiety. As such, this process may be an important therapeutic target for 
clinical interventions. 
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